'Ali tribe. There is one lineage, the Sulwatiyya shown in Figure 7a, which does not claim descent from Sa'ada and hence are no relations of the Awlad 'Ali Bedouin. Nor are any serious ideological claims for tribal membership provided by them or their Awlad 'Ali neighbors. The first social differentiation found in al-Qasr, then, is between those who belong to the Sa'adi tribes and those of the Marabit tribes. In terms of Bedouin social ideal types, the Sa'adi tribesmen are warriors, known for their courage and generosity; the Marabit tribesmen are weak and dependent on the protection which the Sa'adi offers them. The Marabit tends to specialize in the role of "holy man." The dichotamy here is a reflection of the structural differentiation, common to North Africa, between sacred and secular tribes, or client and protector tribes.

The Sa'adi-Marabit division in al-Qasr is defined geographically, in name, and in Bedouin tradition and myth. Here is the way in which the Marabit "holy man" of al-Qasr conceives of the difference between the two types and its origin:

> They are brothers and there is no difference. The Sa'adi is always one step in front of the Marabit, he handles things for the Marabit and helps him. In political matters the Sa'adi is more advanced . . . When the Marabit is in trouble, the Sa'adi will defend him. They are two different groups because the Sa'adi are from one mother. Once Sa'ada was riding in a caravan through the desert.

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539 Her riding booth struck a tree and she found herself stranded there in the tree; her camel had gone and the rest of the caravan noticed nothing and continued on. Then a Marabit passed by and saw her there. He helped her down and they later married. She already had three sons to a former husband: Ali Ahmar, Ali Abyad and Sinaina. The Marabit also had children from another marriage. He was very rich and they could afford to live together. One day thieves began to harrass the man, but when the three Sa'adi sons offered him their help he told them not to bother with the thieves, that they would go away. But they did not, and they continued to harrass the man for a long time. The three sons were still very young at this time. When they grew up they asked the Marabit for arms and horses with which to fight off the thieves. They received them and succeeded in driving off the thieves. The Marabit was very happy and offered the three sons one-half of his wealth, and he was very rich. The sons refused this generous offer saying to the Marabit that they were no different from his other sons and would take only one-tenth of his wealth.

619 The differentiation between the Sa'adi and Marabit has structural consequences only in that it defines psychological types and tends to assign them to certain roles in society. By his [181] psychological make-up, the Marabit, who is weak and retiring, is unfit for the tasks which the Sa'adi undertakes, i.e., war, trade, and politics. It is, nevertheless, expected that the Marabit will act as a support mechanism for the secular operations of the Sa'adi. Usually, this support takes the form of financial contributions.

619 675 Each Marabit group is related through contractual agreement to a Sa'adi group. For instance, the Sulwatiyya lineage of al-Qasr are members of the Jumi'at tribe, a Marabit tribe; when identifying themselves they will say

604 538 brother to special place in the social structure states that
[539] "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus
[539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation may be the basis for a new network of social relations by making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins
[539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know the name of his khal not the name of his father." This statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties, is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

604 578 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal." This, of course, does not mean that the individual should take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political 562 593 554 182 578 value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays

*613 segment, may choose to belong to, or to secede from, the
675 larger corporate group. This element of choice helps to define
591 the authority of the corporate sole. Authority is illegitimate, i.e. it is mere power, when control is exercised against the will of the subjects (Weber 1947).

Above, I have said that authority is legitimated beyond the tertiary level, i.e., at the secondary level, through contractual alliance. By that I mean the same agreement on values is replicated by the authority groups of the lineage. The five authority groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas are bound together by what the Bedouins call "the bonds of the 'awaaqil" (rawaabit al-'awaaqil). Below I present a number of examples of the rawaabit from al-Qasr. Then I continue on to show the nature of the corporate group, and the dynamics of structure and authority in Bedouin society.

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•539 BONDS BETWEEN THE 'AWAAQIL OF 'AILIT MA'FAS

1. Every member of the tribe who has proved against him an intrigue concerning the 'aiela,
2. every member of the tribe who claims against his brother a case which has no basis,
3. every member of the tribe who shifts a border of the borders of a land from one place to another place,
4. every 'aqila is responsible for his followers and must present each with the right direction if he does not convince him first (i.e. if he fails at moral discourse, he must arrange the court session),
5. every member of the tribe who departs from the opinion of his 'aqila and who follows the wrong and erroneous

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6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint without first consulting his 'aqila, (i.e. who goes to the government before the 'aqila),

7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of his bait against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a dhabiiha ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The 'awaaqil (signatures or stamps):
Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

114 619 675 *613 In the rawaabit, or contract, just noted the term "tribe" refers to the secondary segment ('aiela). Murray (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins' use, in a formal document, of the word qabiila ("tribe") when reference to "some smaller division, such as 'eila is clearly meant."

675 681 [183] *613 Through the rawaabit norms are expressed and action is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The minimal sanction which the 'aqila may impose is the dhabiiha

675 ("blood sacrifice") and a fine of 10 L.E. The most serious
681 sanction which the group, through the 'aqila, can administer
*613 is banishment. In this case, the decision "to wash one's hands of another" may originate with the 'aqila but must be executed by the next of kin, or the process can originate with the next of kin and be carried out with the approval of the 'awaaqil. In any case, it is an ultimate negative sanction which ranks with blood-revenge in degree of seriousness, since social and political status is withdrawn from the person. A banished person is no longer protected in accordance with the principle of collective responsibility, and his group may no
675 longer demand blood-money for his life. The charter of 'Ailit
*613 Lazumi presented below is similar in most respects to that of
571 'Ailit Ma'fas with the exception that it makes provision for
681 the barawwa, the act of banishing from the group. The document was issued in four copies to each of the 'awaaqil of Lazumi. Note that in both charters thus far shown, not only are the individuals of the group bound by the rules but, also, the 'aqila comes under the rule of law.

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*613 BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT LAZUMI
571 AL-'AISHAIBAT, (Wednesday, January 19, 1952)
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•539 In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate

In the presence of 'Umran Kailani, Hajj 'Ali, the 'awaaqil and individuals of Bait Bu Jafaila who signed below, this agreement took place and the 'awaaqil of this 'aieia are:

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1 - Hajj Salah Bu Jafaila, 'aqila of Bait Bu Halaiqa
2 - Kuraim Juhami, 'aqila of Bait Uthman
3 - Ruwaf Jadalla, 'aqila of Bait Jadella
4 - Muftah Tahir, 'aqila of Bait Tahir

Every 'aqila is responsible for his family whether concerning the occurrence of problems, and collecting money from his family or other matters. Every person who rejects the opinion of the 'aqila, or reports to the government without the consent of the 'aqila will be subjected to a fine of 10 L.E. and a dabiha according to the 'awaiyid. And every person who delays in carrying out the decisions of the 'aqila and all that he indicates will also be subject to the same fine. And also, any one who delays in swearing the oath or in supporting his family, and in so doing loses the interest which belongs to the 'aiela, he will be subject to the same fine. Any of the 'awaaqil who cause the loss of any right of the rights of the members of the 'aiela will also be subject to the same fine. And any member who makes false claims against any of the other members of the 'aiela is subject to the same fine. And any 'aqila or member from the members of the 'aiela who has proven against him an intrigue, or a quarrel, or prejudice between him and his brother or paternal cousin is subject to the same fine. He is also subject to the same fine who has proven against him prejudice in favor of another party against his paternal cousins, that is to say, the members of this 'aiela. And every 'aqila or individual who delays in signing and accepting these bonds, or in executing them, is considered an outsider by this 'aiela and the 'aiela will not be responsible for him in the future, and this will be considered a barawwa for him from the 'aiela.

This was issued in four copies to the 'awaaqil, and all previous bonds are cancelled from this date and are no longer effective.

Signatures and stamps of 'awaaqil and witnesses.

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The barawwa (literally: "the act of putting outside") is a formal procedure, formal enough to entail having the process notarized as a legal document according to Egyptian civil law. The Bedouins say that the legal document of barawwa is "to show that we have washed our hands of the

*613 of secession, and the nature of the collective responsibility
571 principle in Bedouin society are made clear. The occasion of
681 the writing of this document was the issuance of a "fraternity
675 paper."

BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT ABU QARASA

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Thanks to God alone and nothing survives but His kingdom, praise and peace to Him Who will never have a Prophet who is greater than Himself.

It came into our hands on 10 Shawal 1363 (September 9, 1944), the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat; and the reason for their coming together is in order to merge 'Ailit Abu Qula with the other buyuut as they were in the past. And this is in accordance with the agreement of all the parties to this paper. By the free will of all it became, as of this day, that all of the mentioned buyuut will be connected with the other buyuut in receiving and giving. But all blood-money of the mentioned buyuut which was due before the date 3 Shawal 1361, that is to say all debts for past offences, they and their former relatives will be responsible for. After this date, which is 3 Shawal 1361, each of the mentioned buyuut will share the good and the bad equally. And the 'awaiyid which the mentioned buyuut agreed upon are the following:

1 - First, he who intentionally beats his brother in the 'aiela will pay by himself and no one from the 'aiela will pay anything with him.

2 - But the offense which takes place within the 'aiela, the fine for it will be distributed in such a way that the first half of the payment will go to the offended bait and the second half will be distributed among all of the mentioned buyuut.

3 - The offense which happens to the 'aiela from an outside party, half of the payment goes to the 'aiela and the second half to the offended bait.

*613 571 681 4 - The thief from the mentioned buyuut will be responsible for himself alone, and his relatives in blood (i.e. his bait) will be responsible for him.

• 539 675 5 - The one who is known to lie under oath from the mentioned buyuut, everyone who supports him must be a blood-relative from his bait.

6 - The one who delays paying the share which is requested by the 'aiela, his rich relative will pay.

7 - The one who asks for a barawwa from the 'aiela will pay what is asked for, and at the same time will also pay 20 L.E. barawwa fee for every man who fasts.

8 - The one who supports his relative from some other 'aiela against his paternal cousin will be required to pay 10 L.E. as a fine.

Signatures or stamps of the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Ghriba (who are the former relatives of Bait Abu Qula, the reconciled bait).

*613 554 571 [675] Every point of the above rawaabit shows the moral and political significance of the secondary group in the Bedouin community. Membership in a secondary compound authority group entitles one to political status without which the individual could not survive. The Bedouin community shares certain activities, relationships, and goals so that the aims of any individual can be achieved only by participation in social action with others: this the Bedouins have in common with every other human community (Firth 1951:41). Specifically, in considering society in terms of authority roles and authority groups, we are interested in the political community in which the Bedouins participate.

578 Dawlat, on the decision of the 'awaqil, paid a 200 L.E. diiya
*613 for the leg and the eye. After this, the two families resumed
682 friendly relations.
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[539] In the Name of God the Merciful,
It is the day, 28 Muharram 1382, the same as 1 July 1962. This agreement took place between the following parties: 'Ailit Abu Qarasa and 'Ailit al-Zallat. The reason for this agreement is the quarrel which happened on Wednesday, 24 Muharram, and 27 June. Out of this quarrel resulted the death of the late Juwaida Abd al-Salam. This agreement is made in the presence of the 'awaqil of the two parties and with their full approval (also present was Hajj 'Ali, an important rajal khair about whom we will have more to say). The offending group, namely 'Ailit al-Zallat, will go to live with Hajj Sabr Hamad al-Dawlat at Ras Abu Laha area, according to the way of the nazala among the Awlad 'Ali. 'Ailit al-Zallat may walk between Wadi Umm al-Shitan and Wadi al-Hawari on the west side, the sea on the north side, and the borders of the Qinaishat land on the southern side without a nazil (i.e. one from the protecting party). And if they go out from these mentioned borders, they must be accompanied by one from 'Ailit Dawlat. And if they go beyond the mentioned borders, without a nazil, no one from the protecting party has a right to stop them. And if any from the other party offends them within the mentioned borders, then 'Ailit Abu Qarasa will be subject to whatever is decided against them in accordance with the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. This agreement was made and signed in the presence of the 'awaqil of the Abu Qarasa, and the period of nazala will be one year beginning the date of today. We hope for the help of God.

Signatures or seals of eleven men.
Signature and approval of Marsa Matruh Police Office
Dated: 1 July 1962

578 Date: 1919. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Zallat ('Aishaibat,
*613 'Ali Ahmar) and 'Ailit Hafiyan (Awlad Kharuf, 'Ali Abyad) con-
682 cerning murder. The problem began over the ownership of a well.

Three men from the Hafiyan were killed, and in revenge the

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Date: 24 January 1946
Marsa Matruh

1st Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain of al-Kamailat

2nd Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Hamad Idris of al-'Aishaibat

Both parties, the first and the second, met before the 'awaaqil and witnesses to solve the prevailing problem between them concerning the wounding of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain who claims that this wound is from Hamad Idris. In the presence of the 'awaaqil all agreed that Hamad Idris should swear the oath and be supported by the below named. And the text of the oath which they will say, is: "By the truth (i.e. haqq, which also refers to a divine attribute) of the owner of this shrine, I swear that this bullet which hurt Harun is neither from me nor do I know who shot the bullet at the time of his injury." And a number of sixteen men must support him at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the date of Friday, the 29th of Saffar, 1946. And if any does not present himself for the oath, then the wounds which are present in Harun Abd al-Zain will be from the 'Aishaibat tribe. And if all swear this oath, the two parties will be even with each other. After this, none of them will hold anything against the other. This was issued in the presence of all of their 'awaaqil and with their satisfaction without any force or ill-will.

(On the original document is presented a list of the sixteen men from the lineage of Ma'fas of the 'Aishaibat who were chosen by the Kamailat to support Hamad Idris in the Oath.)

All of the seventeen above mentioned (including Hamad Idris) must be present at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the day Friday, 29 Saffar, in order to swear the oath, and this is what took place at the hand of witnesses, and God is the best witness.

Signatures or seals of all 'awaaqil who were present.

Day of the Oath:

It is on the day Friday, the last of the blessed month of Saffar, 1946. The 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, and with them 'Ailit al-Mahatha of al-Kamailat, came in order to swear the oath at the shrine of Shaikh Yunis al-Jaraira. And they swore this oath and the Kamailat became reconciled

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that they had received their rights in this case. And the two parties are satisfied by this according to the witnesses present.

Signatures or seals of four witnesses.

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The next case represents the only time in the memory of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

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Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned

691 that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was
685 owned by them. Upon the decision of the 'awaaqil, however,
*613 578 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath
692 "because we are all one family." This means, as one 'aqila
695 actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that " 'Ait
Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

423 The following two cases which occur in the external
675 system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat
*613 territory and the other dealing with land rights in the
territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the
formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

• [539] Date: 12 August 1963. A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights.
Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlat of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.

Signatures or seals of seven men.

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Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the 'awaqil) on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi. And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the first is the wadi marker, the second to the sea and beside the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well. This is a decision between the two parties in the presence of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

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The case given below indicates, by the use of two documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit.

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'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

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Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives. They are present. The cause of these two parties coming together is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice

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to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by twenty-four members of his 'umraa al-dam ("blood group") to

423 578 685 691 619 695 [539] be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine, [778] 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

423 619 578 691 [695] Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath. And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

554 571 627 [829] * [613] [577] hence the rajal khair represents a face-saving mechanicam and an alternative which is needed. The rajal khair may even violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.

An informant said that

• [539] the real rajal khair is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 571 577 627 124 [539] I pursued the detail that a rajal khair may lie to restore peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My informant then explained:

I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the rajal khair is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are rajal khair: there are only a few. The rajal khair puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The rajal khair must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the rajal khair lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the rajal khair this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

554 One 'aqila, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in
571 dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of
*613 the rajal khair as compared to his own in matters of conflict
627 regulation:
•[539]

> Both are one (i.e. the 'aqila and the rajal khair), for the rajal khair can also finish a problem. The rajal khair tries to solve the problem, but only the 'aqila judges (yahkum). The rajal khair worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the 'aqila cares only about justice and what is right . . . The rajal khair does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

554 Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically
571 linked to the rajal khair in what resembles a patron-client
627 relationship permit this fact to influence their own inter-
829 pretation of the authority structure. A common view of the
*613 'aqila's formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles, but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

[539] There are good men and there are bad men: the rajal khair is the opposite of a bad man. The rajal khair is not responsible for his group, but the 'aqila is. The 'aqila is chosen from among the elders of the bait so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the rajal khair. The 'aqila is responsible before the 'umda and shaikh, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the diya.

554 The rajal khair represents a vital element in Bedouin
571 society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one
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771 at any time of the day! As one Bedouin put it: "According to the idea of goodness (salih), we are not good. This is because we do not pray, we are part-timers in prayer."

554 792 798 A good rajal saalih is considered by the Bedouin to have a special "blessing" (baraka), a concept somewhat equivalent to that of mana. Someone such as 'Amm Salih is thought to have baraka, and this type of power naturally increases his influence and enhances his status. The following [124] informant's account brings this out and shows something of the magico-religious element at work in Bedouin power relations.

• [539] Hajj 'Ali does not believe in magic but he respects the "holy man" like anyone else. He owns a field from which are taken stones for building houses. One day he saw some men taking stones from this field. They were digging near a well so that the well would not be able to hold water after they had finished. Hajj 'Ali told the men to stop digging. One man answered: "I am cutting these stones for the Jaraira family (the family of 'Amm Salih), and only a few more and we will be finished." Hajj 'Ali replied: "For the Jaraira as for anyone else, we don't favor anyone, so stop the work now." Then Hajj 'Ali went home, never thinking that they would cause any trouble for him, and he was afraid of no harm. He slept and he had a dream. [787] In the dream he saw three of the Jaraira family, all of whom were dead and whom he had known in life. In the dream they only watched him and spoke no words. In the morning Hajj 'Ali went to the co-operative society's office and there he met 'Amm Salih. He said to him: "'Amm Salih, I want to tell you something." Then he related the whole story to him, and said: "I had no fear that you would do me any harm. But last night I saw your relatives in my dream; I had not even thought of them yesterday, so they are not the cause of the dream. [828] (The Bedouins believe that dreams reflect, and are connected with, what you saw or did during the day). So come and take all of the stones that you want, even if you are going to build a palace."

613 member falls on all members alike, regardless of the exact genealogical
672 relationship to the victim. When bloodmoney is to be paid, its members
682 pay it as a group, divided among all male adults; and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnates of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members.

613 The genealogical depth of the Eila is usually five generations. This is not always true, however, In certain instances the number of generations intervening between the founder of the Eila and its living members is nine or even ten. Naturally, the more generations the larger the size of the Eila. Sometimes the Eila becomes so numerous that it is [217] hard to keep records of all members who are supposed to share in the payment of the bloodmoney in a specific case. When the size of the Eila reaches this point, one of two things may happen. The first is an attempt to make lists of the members. Many of the Eilas have such lists. This
613 is usually accompanied by a tendency toward writing down the specific
675 rules and regulations of the vengeance group. These lists are referred to as Amar papers. They constitute a formal statement of an otherwise informally recognized responsibility of the group for certain actions of its members. The other is a tendency toward the fission of one or more of its constiuent units, which, after separation, establishes itself as an independent Amar. The factors underlying this process of fission are discussed in the next chapter.

[539] The following is an example of an Amar paper, that of the Eilat Aggary, which was put into effect in 1954.

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE FORGIVER

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539 The following Awaqil (sing. aqila, the leader of a bait) representing the various "buite" (sing. bait, the tribal segment below the level of eila) of the Aggary Family were witnesses to the treaty and their signatures signify their commitment and that of their respective buite to the content of this agreement.

(a list of the various awaqil)

The above signing awaqil agreed unanimously on the content of the document and all the conditions included. No objection by any of the above persons was noted at the meeting.

Article 1:
The content of this document should be kept as a secret of the Aggary Family. It constitutes the Aggary Amar in accordance with the customs and the Daraieb of Awlad Ali. The content of the document should be revealed only at the request of both parties of a dispute which involves a member of the Amar.

Article 2:
[627] Peace should exist between members of the Amar. No secret grudges or open disputes should be permitted between them. In case such an unfortunate situation exists, the other non-involved members of the Amar should intervene between the disputants, try to solve the dispute, and prevent it from damaging the solidarity of the Amar. They should investigate the facts of the case and force the guilty party to compensate his brother (the wronged party) without giving the former a chance to object.

Article 3:
[681] When the Amar is called upon because of obligation involving the payment of money, all the Awaqil should meet and decide the amount of money that should be collected from each Bait of the Aggary Family. It becomes then the responsibility of each Aqila to collect the amount from his Bait.

Article 4:
[681] [885] The share of each Bait is based upon the number of "Sayems", (literally, "fasting males", which is interpreted to mean 15 years of age or over), regardless of whether or not they have a source of income for themselves. The share of those without means of their own is distributed among the other members of the Bait.

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Each Aqila is responsible for submitting to the Amar a list of the Sayems in his bait, and this will be the basis for establishing the share of the bait in payment or receipt of the money.

Article 5:

No Aqila can act on any matter involving loss or gain to the Amar without the presence of the other Awaqil of the Amar, unless an urgent matter occurs in which waiting for the rest of the Awaqil might jeopardize the interest of the Amar. In such cases the Awaqil present can act on behalf of the Amar as a whole.

Article 6:

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The following acts should not involve the Amar as a whole and the offender is considered individually (or with his own Bait) responsible for them:

1. Theft and cheating.
2. Insult or disrespect of a younger member of the Amar to an older person whether from the Amar or not.
3. Entering someone's tent or home without permission.
4. Seduction of women (including rape and adultery).

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In all the above cases the individual has to bear the responsibility for his own actions. For to let the Amar pay for him in such circumstances is to encourage him and other such members of the Amar to commit more of such acts and bring disgrace to the Amar. If the offender is unable to pay for his crime, his nearest male kin should pay for him in accordance with the Awlad Ali Daraieb. Such payments are considered as personal debts which the offender has to pay back as soon as he is financially able.

Article 7:

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When an older person does injustice to a younger one, the latter should take his complaint to the Aqila of his own bait. The Aqila in turn should take the matter up with the Aqila of the older man or to all the awaqil of the Amar if the matter is serious enough. The awaqil must assess the facts and prevent the older man from doing any more injustice to the younger man and have the former compensate him for any damage he might have caused the younger man by his actions. If the awaqil fail to do this and if their failure resulted in the younger insulting or hurting the older, his acts become no longer an individual responsibility for which he has to pay alone, and the Amar should pay for him.

Article 8:

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No members of the Amar should take sides in disputes involving families or individuals outside the Amar unless the awaqil in the Amar investigate the matter and the reasons for the dispute and decide that the Amar as a whole should be on one side of the dispute or the other.

613 675 539 **Article 9:**

The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.

Article 10:

[628] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. [619] If he refuses, they should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

Article 11:

[563] [619] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to join the Aggary Family or one of its constiuent buite must be asked first about the reason or reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

[695] [693] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

9: Murray E, K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

first successes in Senegal, the Beni Hilal and the Beni Suleim were being despatched by the Caliph Mustansir billah against Mu'izz ibn Badis, his rebellious viceroy in Tripoli. They sang of their conquest :

" Great was the king, son of Badis, a mighty man of war !
Yet we routed his thirty thousand men !
We were but three thousand, yet the victory was ours, and ours the spoil !
Their hearts were as water, not a man was in their ranks !
We routed them and they fled far and wide ! "

These Beni Hilal, now extinct, are famous wherever Arabic is spoken for the exploits of their legendary hero Abu Zeid, while the Beni Suleim had helped the Prophet at the battle of Hunein, and are said by Hogarth to be the ancestors of the great modern tribe of Harb.[1]

The confusion of these two invasions caused the races of North Africa to become inextricably mixed. Both Arabs and Berbers spent their lives in the desert herding their flocks, and both were warlike. So it is natural that the intermarriages of a few generations should have made one people of them, and it is also natural that the conquered should claim relationship with the conquerors and not vice versa. But this aspiration of the Berbers has flooded their genealogies with so many lies that it is difficult to disentangle the truth.

The descendants of the original colonists, much mixed with Berber blood, still preserve their title of Murabitin, though no longer living in *ribat*, which soon lost their military character and were turned into *Zawia* " monasteries ", where the more peacefully inclined of the sect retired for religious teaching and contemplation. Later, when the *ribat* came to be deserted, the peaceful Murabitin, ill-fitted by their monastic habits for the resumption of an active nomadic life, sank into dependence on their warlike brethren the Sa'adi, and, among a primitive race, dependence means inferiority. Thus in Arabia any tribe that pays tribute to another is despised as Hiteim. And so the once proud title of " Murabitin " has simply come to mean " vassal " and nothing more.

[1] *History of Arabia*, 38.